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Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?
Judith van de Looy and Leo de Haan
Abstract
Relations between Africa and China have increased over the years and
become more dominated by China’s economic interests. With an annual
growth rate of 8-9 per cent, and a booming economy, China’s
dependency on accessing natural resources is a top priority and has
accordingly expanded its horizons. Africa, with all its seemingly
unlimited natural resources, is an ideal partner. In addition, the African
continent as a whole offers a potential market for China’s low-value
manufactured commodities. This paper is an attempt to present an
overview of contemporary Sino-African relations and the state of trade
relations, with special emphasis on natural resources and the export
market for Chinese products and investments in Africa.
Introduction
China’s relations with Africa during the twentieth century were geo-
politically motivated, as it was a way of opposing the super powers and
western hegemony. China stated to share a common identity with Africa,
as a Third World country itself. However, in the 1990s this approach towards
Africa became more economically motivated. Increasing numbers of
Chinese companies are developing connections in Africa with the aim of
increasing trade between China and the African continent. This relationship
between China and Africa has not gone unnoticed. Questions about how
to deal with this development and its consequences are being raised. This
paper is an attempt to present an overview of contemporary Sino-African
relations and the state of trade relations, with special emphasis on natural
resources and the export market for Chinese products and investments in
Africa.
Sino-African Trade
China and Africa have concluded various trade agreements in the past.
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The first initiatives were taken in the framework of the 1955 Bandung
Conference. This agreement was merely political, but while establishing
diplomatic ties with African countries, economic and cultural agreements
were also signed by both parties. In 2000, the first large-scale conference
on Sino-African trade was held in Beijing. According to China, the purpose
of the Sino-African Forum was ‘the construction of an international political
and economic order and [to] explore new Sino-African cooperation’. Over
40 African states with 80 foreign ministers and ministers in charge of
international economic cooperation were present. In addition, 17
international and regional organizations, NGOs and entrepreneurs were
also in attendance to discuss South-South cooperation, the North-South
dialogue, debt relief, and Chinese economic cooperation with African
states.1 The conference produced two key documents, namely, the Beijing
Declaration and the Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in
Economics and Social Development. The latter described Chinese
investments in Africa, financial cooperation between China and the African
Development Bank Group (ADB), debt relief and cancellation, agricultural
cooperation, natural resources and energy, education and multilateral
cooperation.2
Figure 1:  China’s Total Imports and Exports, 1978-2004
 Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of China
In 2003, the second China-Africa Cooperation Forum was held in Addis
Ababa when Prime Minister Wen Jiabao declared that Chinese economic
assistance and investment ‘comes with the deepest sincerity and without
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any political conditionalities’. During the meetings in 2000, South Africa
raised the issue of debt relief, which China opposed. However three years
later it announced debt relief for African countries to the tune of US$1.27
billion and granted aid packages to several states. By making this gesture
towards African states, China placed itself on equal terms with the West
regarding operations in Africa.3
China’s post-Maoist era is characterized by economic expansion. The
figure below shows the total value of China’s exports and imports between
1978 and 2004. It can be seen that from 1994 onwards growth has increased
and now exceeds US$100 billion.
Trade between China and Africa has quadrupled since 2000 when trade
between Africa and China totalled around US$10 billion. Just five years
later it had increased to US$28 billion. Table 3 shows the development of
Sino-African trade between 1999 and 2003. China is now Africa’s third
largest commercial partner after the United States and France, and the
second largest exporter to Africa after France. Remarkably, Britain – as a
former colonial power – has been left far behind by China.4
  Table 1:  Sino-African Trade, 1999-2003 (in US$ million)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
6459.3 10563.5 10755.7 12346.9         18487.1
    Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of China
China’s economic relationship with Africa can be divided into: the drive
for resources; new export markets; and new investment opportunities for
Chinese companies. Exports from Africa to China are primarily
commodities and oil, while African imports from China consist of
manufactured goods such as industrial products, electrical equipment and
machinery, textiles and household utensils.
Resources : Exports to China
China currently has the fastest growing economy in the world, with
an annual growth rate of 8-9 per cent. But such rapid economic
development in the post-Maoist era has required a steady and growing
supply of oil. A major change came about in 1993, when China became an
energy importer instead of a net exporter. China’s demand for oil has been
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so rapid that in 2004 the country became the world’s second largest oil
importer after the US. The growing demand is due to not only an expanding
economy but also to a generally wealthier society with its increased demand
for consumer goods such as cars and refrigerators. It is estimated that the
Chinese demand for oil will increase by 156 per cent between the years
2001 and 2025.
Figure 2:  Oil Demand and Net Imports, 1971-2004
Source: IEA, Oil Information 2005
China is seeking new suppliers to fulfil its oil requirements in order to
diversify its sources and achieve energy security. In Africa, where new
reservoirs have recently been found, China has every possible chance of
success when it comes to exploiting new sources. To gain and retain control
of these sources, it is allocating considerable military, politico-diplomatic
and economic resources.5
Africa possesses around 8 per cent of the world’s oil reserves and 11
per cent of world oil production. It is estimated that production in Africa
is rising 6 per cent annually. By 2007, it will reach seven million barrels a
day and by 2010 this figure is estimated to become eight million. New
deep-water oil discoveries have been made in the Gulf of Guinea, more
specifically in Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. International oil
companies are continuing to invest in the continent; good conditions are
offered by African leaders and most of the oil is being found offshore which
has advantages for the loading of tankers and provides a degree of stability
in oil production levels. African oil is also of high quality.
A quarter of China’s oil imports come from Africa: from Algeria, Angola,
Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. The thirst for oil is
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becoming so important that even the ‘One China Principle’ is being
disregarded since Chad has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. A new
pipeline from Chad to Cameroon opened in 2003 so that oil from Chad
can be transported directly to a major port. Even though this trade in
natural resources has a positive effect on the trade balance, it has some
disadvantages as well. The production of oil merely requires capital
investment and labourers are not required in large numbers. Moreover, in
countries where oil is abundant, governments tend to focus on the wealth-
generating oil sector and to neglect other sectors. Corruption is mentioned
as a frequent problem.
As the need for energy becomes even greater in the future, the scenario
described above can be expected to become more common. The
international community has already accused China of unethical practices
in Africa. The boxes below describe the cases of Sudan and Angola and
their relationship with China.6
Box 1: China in Sudan
Sudan’s total oil reserves are currently estimated at five billion barrels.
The country produces about 500,000 barrels a day and this figure is likely
to increase to 750,000 b/d in 2006. According to the WTO, oil exports to
China accounted for 64 per cent of Sudan’s total oil exports in 2004.China’s
first oil imports from Sudan were in 1995. China’s National Petroleum
Corporation began oil exploration there and has expanded steadily. In
1997, the US imposed economic and trade sanctions on Sudan and China
then moved in to fill the gap that Western countries had left. Currently,
China National Petroleum is the largest shareholder and essentially
controls the Sudanese energy sector as it is the main investor in Sudanese
oil production. China covered the cost of most of the US$15 billion 932-
mile pipeline to Port Sudan where it is building a tanker terminal. In 2005,
approximately 10,000 Chinese workers were employed in Sudan.Both
China and Sudan benefit from this relationship. China has been able to
diversify its oil resources and become less dependent on other oil-
producing countries while Sudan has found a reliable economic partner
that does not question its domestic political situation. China has offered a
financial lifeline to the Sudanese government. In addition, China’s position
on the UN Security Council has meant that Sudan has avoided serious
sanctions by the West. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1556
which demanded that the Sudanese government disarm the Janjaweed
and bring to justice those leaders who had incited and carried out human-
rights abuses. The Security Council threatened to consider further
sanctions if the government failed to comply. China, as a permanent
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member, threatened to use its veto power and urged the West to ‘cool
down’. As mentioned earlier, China has assisted Sudan financially and
militarily even though it was aware of the widespread ethnic cleansing
taking place in Darfur. Human Rights Watch has for this reason accused
China of cooperating in the genocide in Darfur since 2003. In conclusion,
good relations between the two governments have resulted in China being
the main stakeholder in the oil business in Sudan. To procure oil for its
expanding economy, China has supported the Sudanese government both
financially and politically and ignored any related ethical issues. In other
words, energy security overrides other concerns.
Sources: A. Malaquias, “Thirsty Powers, the United States, China and Africa’s
Energy Resources”, Paper for 3rd FLAD-IPRI International Conference on
“Portugal, the US and Southern Africa”, 2005WTO  “Share of China in
Selected Economies”, Merchandise Exports and Imports, 2000 and 2004’,
2006.http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/chp_0_e/
ch1.xls(Accessed on March 27, 2006)Walta Information Centre (2006)
“Africa: China&apos;s Great Leap into the Continent”, at
www.waltainfo.com/Analysis/2006/Mar/11022.htm (Accessed March 28,
2006)HRW, ‘The United Nations and Darfur ’, 2005, at https://
www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/3.htm (Accessed April 13, 2006)
Box 2: China in Angola
Angola is currently recovering from a thirty-year civil war and donors
from western countries are assisting in the much-needed reconstruction
of institutions and the economy.China is also present in Angola, assisting
in infrastructure reconstruction. China  offered Angola a ‘soft’ loan of US$2
billion with no political strings attached in March 2004. The terms of the
loan specify its repayment within 17 years at an interest rate of 1.5%. The
money has been earmarked for reconstruction and development projects
such as railways, electricity and administrative buildings. However, the
terms of the agreement are advantageous for China as 70% of the
construction projects are to be assigned to Chinese companies. Domestic
contractors can be awarded only 30% of the projects covered by the loan,
a fact that is causing consternation among Angolan businessmen.
Moreover, it is expected that the loan is not going to create livelihood
opportunities for the poor. A second important term of the agreement is
that China can import 10,000 barrels of oil a day from Angola. Angola
currently exports 25% of its oil to China. The loan, which was initially
intended for the reconstruction of the country, is being used for other
purposes as well. According to Global Witness, some of the money has
been used for government propaganda in the 2006 elections. Global Witness
has declared that part of the problem lies in the country’s unwillingness to
be more transparent about its oil revenues. It prefers to sign commercial
loans backed by oil than cheaper loans from large international institutions
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such as the World Bank and the IMF that demand reforms and transparency.
China’s loan therefore is undermining the international pressure being
put on the government to invest in the development of Angola.
Sources: A. Malaquias, “Thirsty Powers, the United States, China and
Africa’s Energy Resources”. Paper for 3rd FLAD-IPRI International
Conference on “Portugal, the US and Southern Africa,” 2005.Servant,
“China’s Trade Safari in Africa”, 2005, at www.mondediplo.com/2005/05/
chinafrica (Accessed on March 30,  2006)Global Witness (2005) “Western
Banks to Give Huge New Loan to Angola in Further Blow to Transparency”,
2005, at  www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/pdf/releases/
gw_angola_230905.pdf (Accessed on April 14, 2006)
Another natural resource that China needs to import from Africa to
support its own economic growth is timber. Until recently, the demand
for timber was met by domestic loggers. However in 1998, the Yangtze
River overflowed resulting in 2,500 deaths and billions of dollars in damage.
Following these floods, the Chinese government banned logging in large
parts of China and has begun to protect its healthy forests and replant
woodlands that had already been cleared for agriculture. These measures
were taken to prevent further large-scale disasters, such as the 1998 floods.
Internal pressure has forced China to import timber from other countries
and imports of industrial wood have more than tripled since 1993. China
is now importing considerable amounts of wood from the forests of
Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Liberia. But in
Cameroon, exports from illegal logging amount to 50 per cent of total
exports of wood, and in Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia the figure
has risen to 90 per cent. The types of wood that are being exported are not
declared in national trade statistics, which makes it impossible to determine
its real impact.7 According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
main exporting countries are Nigeria, the Central African Republic,
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. China is the world’s leading exporter of
textiles and clothing. In spite of its own domestic production, China still
needs to import cotton, which it does from the US. However, the share of
the African countries that export cotton – Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, Guinea,
Nigeria, Togo and the Central African Republic – has increased since the
mid-1990s.8
China not only imports oil and minerals from Africa, it is also interested
in importing food to feed its own population.9 China is currently investing
in agriculture, fisheries and related secondary production in Africa and
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has already signed contracts with Sierra Leone, Gabon and Namibia to
allow Chinese fishermen to fish in their coastal waters. In addition, they
have leased agricultural land in Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.10
To conclude, certain African countries – mainly Sudan and Angola
with their oil exports – are the prime exporters of African natural resources
and commodities to China. Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon export
timber as well as oil, while exports from South Africa to China comprise
mainly of manufactured goods.
Figure 3: African Exports to China, by Country
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of China
Imports from China
Africa does not only export resources to China. Many goods are also
being imported from China. Even though the African market is relatively
small for consumer goods – Africa’s population totals approximately 800
million – China has been able to find a ready market for its cheap, low-
quality consumer products and it is trying aggressively to take control of
the African market. According to one Chinese trade analyst, ‘Chinese
products are well-suited to the African market. At the moment, China is
in a position to manufacture basic products at very low prices and of
satisfactory quality.’11
Many products are produced in state-owned factories in China and
sold through a growing informal network of trading posts across urban
and rural Africa. The number of Chinese traders in Africa has increased
since the 1960s when Chinese traders settled in Africa on a large scale. In
1949, there were about 27,000 Chinese people in Africa and this number
had grown to 130,000 by 1999. Most of these traders settled in Mauritius,
Madagascar and South Africa12 but, according to observers, the number
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of Chinese in West Africa is increasing as well. These African traders import
Chinese goods that are attractively priced for the African market where
purchasing power is limited. African businessmen too increase their profit
margins in this process by cutting out intermediaries. This is the case in
almost all African countries and the African market is being flooded with
cheap Chinese products.13
Thus, Africa is a new and interesting market with excellent conditions
for the Chinese with its many potential customers for cheap Chinese
products. The imported goods are mostly household utensils, mechanical
and electric products, textiles and clothes. China is focusing its exports on
countries with large populations, for example, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt,
Morocco and Algeria. These five countries, with their relatively high
purchasing power by African standards, together account for 58 per cent
of African imports from China.
Figure 4: African Imports from China, by Country
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of China
One of the main commodities that China exports to Africa is textiles, a
sector in which it is able to compete with Africa due to its low labour costs.
In fact, Chinese textile exports are undermining local African production
and concern about this is growing. China has increased its textile and
clothing exports even further since its accession to the WTO in 2001. Table
4 shows the rapid increase in China’s share of the market since becoming
a member of the WTO. 14
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Table 2:  China’s Share of Total Imports, in Selected Countries
Textiles ( per cent) Clothing (per cent)
1995             2002 1995                    2002
Australia                19.3              35.2                         54.3      70.4
Japan                       41.1              66.5                         59.1                    77.5
South Africa            5.9              18.5                          29                       56.3
Switzerland            3.9                5.2                            8.8                       9.3
Source: WTO, “The Global Textile and Clothing Industry Post the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing”, 2004.
Recently, the share of Chinese textiles in the South African market
increased even further and 86 per cent of South Africa’s clothing imports
currently come from China.  Not only has the domestic market been
affected by the sudden rise, exports of African textiles have also been hit.
The growth of Chinese exports to the US is negatively affecting the
previously promising growth that African exports were enjoying in this
field. This negative impact on African exports comes from the ending of
the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), which had allowed countries like the
US to place quotas on clothing and textile imports from certain countries.
The MFA lasted for 30 years from 1974 until 2004 and was designed to set
quotas on the levels of imports of textiles and clothing from ‘developing’
to ‘developed’ countries, essentially safeguarding industries in the
industrialized countries and controlling the level of market access for
imports from developing countries. In 2000, the US and 48 African states
drew up the African Growth and Opportunity Act, (AGOA), which gave
African states full access to the American market and resulted in textiles
becoming a major growth opportunity. Southern Africa in particular began
to focus on its textile industry. However once the MFA ended on 1 January
2005, the export of Chinese textiles to the US began to flourish and African
exporters could not compete. More than ten clothing factories in Lesotho
closed in 2005, and South African exports to the US dropped from US$26
million in the first quarter of 2004 to US$12 million in 2005. 15
China’s involvement in the African textile sector is not new and the
country has always been pragmatic about international trade. In 1999,
Chinese investors set up factories in Lesotho and Swaziland to take
advantage of the AGOA agreement and have duty-free access to American
markets. In this way, China could avoid US and EU quotas on Chinese
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textiles. When the MFA ended, China simply closed the factories, leaving
thousands of people unemployed. Production in China itself was cheaper
and therefore more profitable.
Box 3: Chinese Arms in Africa
Arms have always been among the Chinese commodities exported to
Africa. During the struggle for independence, China exported arms to fight
western imperialism and, later, China supported African states with
weapons during the Cold War. An ideology for a new world order lay at
the root of these exchanges. And China is still exporting arms to certain
countries although the reasons behind these exports has become less
idealistic.Selling arms to some African leaders improves bilateral
relationships and can enhance Chinese access to oil and natural resources.
China does not demonstrate much concern for human rights, which they
consider to be a Western concept. Some experts say that China is now
selling military equipment worldwide and views Africa as a potential
market for the sale of military hardware. The involvement of China in
African politics also becomes clear when one looks at the military exchanges
between China and African states. Over the years Chinese defence ministers
have paid numerous visits to their African colleagues and vice-
versa.According to the Congressional Research Service, China’s arms sales
to Africa between 1996 and 2003 made up 10 per cent of all arms transfers
to Africa. During the Ethiopian–Eritrean war in 1998, it delivered arms to
both sides for a total of more than US$ 1 billion. China sold the Sudanese
government weapons and helicopters that were used in Darfur to terrorize
the local people.In 2000, Zimbabwe delivered eight tons of Zimbabwean
ivory in exchange for a shipment of small arms. And in 2004, China sold
the Zimbabwean army 12 fighter jets and 100 trucks in a deal worth more
than US$200 million. The shift of allegiances by President Mugabe is
understandable: having been rejected by the West, he designed a new
‘Look East’ policy. Nowadays, nearly all of Zimbabwe’s trade is with China,
which is investing in minerals, roads and agriculture.
Sources: Servant,“China’s Trade Safari in Africa”, 2005, at
www.mondediplo.com/2005/05/chinafrica (Accessed on March 30,
2006)Chinese Government, 2002, at  www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/
default.htm (Accessed on March 20, 2006)Pan (2006) “China, Africa and
Oil”, 2006, at  www.cfr.org/publication/9557 (Accessed on April 18, 2006)
Chinese Investments in Africa
A third characteristic of trade relations between Africa and China is
investment by Chinese companies in Africa. By 2004, nearly 700 Chinese
companies were operating in 49 African countries. Chinese state companies
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invest mainly in oil, mines, fishing, woods and precious metals and
infrastructure as well as in sectors that the West has neglected because
they are less profitable. For example, China has reopened the Zambian
copper mines and is looking for oil fields off the coast of Gabon. In 2004,
Chinese investments in Africa accounted for more than US$900 million.
This is around 6 per cent of total investments of US$16 billion in Africa.16
Not surprisingly, China is investing in countries where it is getting its
natural resources from. In 2004, oil-exporting countries such as Algeria,
Libya, Nigeria and Sudan accounted for 54 per cent of total Chinese
investments. Zambia is also an important trade partner and China recently
reopened the Chambezi Mining Company. Other countries that received
a relatively large share were Ethiopia and Botswana.17 According to the
Chinese, Botswana has a politically stable environment and enjoys amicable
relations with its neighbouring countries. Moreover, its products enjoy
free access to the whole Southern African market. All these factors are in
fact positive reasons why increasing numbers of Chinese businesses and
investments – ranging from construction, textiles, services and wholesale
and retail industries – are coming to Botswana.18
Not all Chinese investment in Africa is viewed positively by the
international community. First, Chinese (construction) firms have lower
costs and can consequently outbid their western competitors, winning
contracts for projects. International observers fear that the Chinese way of
doing business – paying bribes and attaching no conditions – undermines
local efforts to increase transparency and good governance. And the IMF
and the World Bank are unable to then put as much pressure on countries
because they are supported by China. Finally, Chinese companies are
bringing their own labourers to work in Africa. In areas where
unemployment is already high, the effects of migrant Chinese labour will
be felt over time. For example in Angola, some domestic suppliers and
retailers have had to close down because they could not compete with the
Chinese. In other parts of Africa resentment against the Chinese is also
being felt.19 Though each of these critiques is legitimate in its own right,
the selectivity with which they are put forward sometimes raises questions
about the sincerity of the commentator.
Conclusion
Relations between Africa and China have increased over the years and
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become more dominated by China’s economic interests. With an annual
growth rate of 8-9 per cent, the Chinese economy expanded enormously,
and accessing natural resources became a priority. China had to broaden
its horizons. Africa, with all its seemingly unlimited natural resources, was
an ideal partner. In addition, the African continent as a whole was a
potential market for China’s low-value manufactured commodities.
Exports from Africa to China are based on natural resources: oil is the
most important resource. About 25 per cent of Chinese oil imports are
from Africa, with its major sources being in Sudan, Angola, Nigeria and
Chad. Other important resources are cotton and timber, the latter often
being exported illegally to China. Furthermore, China is investing in the
agricultural sector because the land available for agriculture in China is
decreasing as its population increases. African imports from China are
primarily low-value commodities to countries with large populations, for
example, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt. Current trade relations
between China and Africa trigger large investments by Chinese companies
in Africa with construction projects in infrastructure development,
buildings and factories.
Sino-African trade and aid relations have implications for Africa. One
advantage is the increased room for manoeuvre for African states now
that they are no longer totally dependent on the West. In addition, increasing
oil production has boosted the revenue of African states. On the other
hand, exports of textiles and household utensils from China dominate the
African market and, as a consequence, African factories have had to close.
China is Africa’s third biggest trading partner, after the United States and
France. China is fast becoming a dominant player in Africa.  However,
Africa is less important for China. In spite of increased oil exports from
Africa, the continent’s total trade with China amounts to only 2 per cent of
its international trade.
What stands out is that increasingly the West seeks to withstand
economic competition from China in Africa by shifting as it were the
encounter to an ethical field of human rights, corruption and good
governance which economic relations should respect in all circumstances.
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